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McKAY, Circuit Judge. 
 
              Petitioner-Appellant Mircea Marincas, an alien 
with stowaway status, applied for and was denied political asylum 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  The Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial of his 
application.  Mr. Marincas then sought judicial review of the BIA 
decision by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a 
complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief.  The district 
court denied relief.  We reverse. 
 
I.       Factual and Procedural Background 
              Petitioner is a former soldier in the Romanian 
Army.  He claims that he expressed opposition to and questioned 
the legitimacy of the new Romanian government installed after the 
overthrow of the Communist-totalitarian government of Nicolae 
Ceausescu.  Mr. Marincas asserts that he was arrested, severely 
beaten, and threatened by Romanian authorities after he 
criticized the new government, which is apparently comprised 
almost entirely of former members of the old Communist regime.  
He claims that he fled Romania when he realized that he could not 
be safe in his homeland. 
              Mr. Marincas eventually arrived in the United 
States as a stowaway with a group of Romanian nationals on April 
14, 1994, aboard a ship called the M/V Innovation.  Mr. Marincas 
requested asylum immediately upon his arrival in the United 
States, claiming he fled Romania because of political 
persecution.  He was detained as an excludable alien because of 
his stowaway status, and the INS required the owner of the M/V 
Innovation, Sea Land Services, Inc., to keep him in physical 
custody.   
              Mr. Marincas completed his first application for 
political asylum on April 17, 1994.  At that time he was not 
informed of his right to be represented by counsel in his asylum 
interview or of the availability of free legal services.  An INS 
official interviewed Petitioner, and his asylum claim was denied.  
Petitioner appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the INS's denial 
of asylum. 
              Petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition 
seeking a stay of his deportation.  The petition was dismissed 
after the INS conceded the inadequacy of the first proceeding and 
remanded the case for new proceedings.  In November 1994, 
Petitioner was interviewed by the same asylum officer who had 
previously denied his claim.  Petitioner was represented by 
counsel at the second interview, but his counsel was only allowed 
several minutes to question Petitioner and to advocate on his 
behalf.  A third interview was conducted by another asylum 
officer after Petitioner's counsel objected to the INS about the 
second interview being conducted by the same asylum officer.  
Also, Petitioner submitted a supplemental statement in support of 
his application and numerous exhibits that allegedly documented 
the persecution he suffered in Romania.  His application was 
again denied. 
              On April 7, 1995, Petitioner filed another appeal 
with the BIA and requested time in which to file a brief.  On May 
4, 1995, the BIA denied the appeal without having accepted 
Petitioner's brief.  The BIA entered a final order of deportation 
for Mr. Marincas.  Petitioner then initiated this action.  The 
district court reviewed the deportation order pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10), which permits habeas review of deportation 
orders.  Petitioner asserted that he was denied meaningful 
administrative review of his application because his application 
was considered by an INS official instead of a neutral 
immigration judge and that the BIA improperly affirmed the denial 
of his asylum without giving him an opportunity to submit a 
brief.  The district court denied Mr. Marincas' petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Deferring to the BIA's interpretation of 
the applicable immigration statutes, the district court found Mr. 
Marincas was provided all of the process due him on his claim for 
asylum.  The court also found that reasonable evidence supported 
the INS's denial of Mr. Marincas' asylum application. 
              We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final 
order of deportation.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Petitioner is currently 
in INS custody at York County Prison in York, Pennsylvania.  We 
have not issued a formal order staying Petitioner's deportation, 
but the Department of Justice has agreed to comply with our 
request not to deport Petitioner during the pendency of this 
appeal. 
 
II.  United States Treaty Obligations 
         The United States is a signatory to the United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (U.N. Protocol), 
which incorporated the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.  The U.N. Protocol provides: 
                    No Contracting State shall expel or return 
                    ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
                    whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
                    where his life or freedom would be threatened 
                    on account of his race, religion, 
                    nationality, membership in a particular 
                    social group or political opinion. 
           
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 
33(1), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.  
Refugees are defined as "a person who owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country."  Id. art. 1. 
              The purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980, which 
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, was "to provide a 
permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this 
country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United 
States."  Pub. L. 96-212, tit. I, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).  
Also, the Refugee Act brought the domestic laws of the United 
States into conformity with its treaty obligations under the 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.  See INS v. Stevic, 
467 U.S. 407, 421, 427 (1984).  In response to the urgent needs 
of those subject to persecution in their homelands, the Refugee 
Act revised and regularized the procedures governing the 
admission of refugees into the United States.  Pub. L. No. 96- 
212, tit. I, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).  In this respect, the 
Supreme Court explained: 
                        Deportation is always a harsh measure; 
                    it is all the more replete with danger when 
                    the alien makes a claim that he or she will 
                    be subject to death or persecution if forced 
                    to return to his or her home country.  In 
                    enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 Congress 
                    sought to "give the United States sufficient 
                    flexibility to respond to situations 
                    involving political or religious dissidents 
                    and detainees throughout the world." 
           
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, the Refugee Act was enacted to fulfill our 
treaty obligations under the U.N. Protocol for the benefit of 
aliens, such as Mr. Marincas in this case, who claim to be 
fleeing persecution in their homelands.   
 
III.     The Meaning of the Refugee Act of 1980 
              The district court, deferring to the BIA's 
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the 
Refugee Act of 1980, concluded that the stowaways are not 
entitled to immigration court hearings on their asylum claims.  
We reverse the district court because the BIA's construction of 
the applicable immigration statutes are contrary to clear and 
unambiguous congressional intent. 
 
A.       The Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act 
         of 1980 
 
              Aliens who arrive in the United States but are 
refused entry by an immigration officer are generally entitled to 
an exclusion hearing under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).  Act of June 27, 1952, tit. II, ch. 4, § 235, 66 Stat. 198 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1988)).  At the hearing, an 
immigration judge decides whether or not the alien should be 
admitted.  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).  If the alien asserts an asylum 
claim, he is entitled to an asylum hearing before an immigration 
judge.  8 C.F.R. § 236.3(c). 
              Stowaways, however, have a distinct status.  Under 
the INA they are excludable aliens who are not entitled to an 
exclusion hearing.  The INA states, "Any alien who is a stowaway 
is excludable."  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(D).  The INA further 
provides that stowaways are not entitled to an exclusion 
hearing.  8 U.S.C. § 1323(d).  Section 1323(d) states, "The 
[exclusion hearing] provisions . . . shall not apply to aliens 
who arrive as stowaways and no such alien shall be permitted to 
land in the United States, except temporarily for medical 
treatment, or pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney 
General may prescribe for the ultimate departure or removal or 
deportation of such alien from the United States."  While 
stowaways are not entitled to an exclusion hearing, the statute 
permits stowaways to land in the United States pursuant to 
regulations prescribed for the ultimate departure, removal or 
deportation of the alien. 
              The Refugee Act mandated for the first time that 
uniform procedures be established by the Attorney General for 
granting asylum to aliens arriving in the United States.  The 
Refugee Act amended the INA by providing: 
                        The Attorney General shall establish a 
                    procedure for an alien physically present in 
                    the United States or at a land border or port 
                    of entry, irrespective of such alien's 
                    status, to apply for asylum, and the alien 
                    may be granted asylum in the discretion of 
                    the Attorney General if the Attorney General 
                    determines that such alien is a refugee 
                    within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) 
                    of this title. 
          8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).  We are asked to review whether the Attorney 
General correctly interpreted the INA and the Refugee Act in 
promulgating the current asylum procedures. 
 
B.       INS's Regulations and Asylum Procedures 
              The INS regulations initially promulgated by the 
Attorney General pursuant to the Refugee Act made no explicit 
distinction between stowaways and other asylum applicants.  See Yui Sing 
Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 874 (2d Cir. 1983).  
Instead, the INS applied the regulations differently to 
stowaways.  See id.  The INS proposed regulations in 1987 that 
would have provided a nonadversarial procedure as the sole method 
of adjudicating the asylum claims of all applicants.  52 Fed. 
Reg. 32552-61 (1987).  The INS withdrew the proposed regulations 
after receiving widespread criticism that such a process was 
inherently inadequate as the sole adjudication of an asylum 
claim.  Instead, the INS issued new regulations in 1988 which 
provided asylum applicants an adversarial adjudication of their 
asylum claims through an immigration court hearing.  53 Fed. Reg. 
11300 (1988).  The nonadversarial adjudication by INS officials, 
however, was explicitly retained in the regulations for stowaway 
asylum applicants.  53 Fed. Reg. 11310 (1988). 
              Under current INS procedures, an application for 
asylum is initially handled by an asylum officer.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.9(a).  An immigration judge acquires jurisdiction over the 
asylum application if the applicant has been placed in an 
exclusion or deportation hearing.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(b), 
208.4(c).   Consequently, asylum applicants who are not stowaways 
cannot be removed from the United States without having their 
asylum claims adjudicated in an adversarial hearing before an 
immigration judge who is independent of the INS.  The immigration 
judge is required to advise the applicant that he has a right to 
counsel and that free legal services are available.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.2(a).  At the hearing before the immigration judge, the 
applicant has the right to present evidence and witnesses on his 
own behalf, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a), 236.3(c)(3); to examine and 
object to adverse evidence, 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a); to cross-examine 
witnesses presented by the INS, 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a); to compel 
testimony of witnesses by subpoena, 8 C.F.R. § 3.35; to a 
transcript and record of the entire proceeding, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.2(e); and to administrative review, 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.38, 
236.7. 
              In contrast, the asylum applications of stowaways 
are decided in a nonadversarial interview procedure conducted by 
an asylum officer who is an INS employee.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(a), 
208.9, 253.1(f).  The stowaway applicant may have counsel 
present, but the regulations do not require the asylum officer to 
advise the applicant of his right to counsel or of the  
availability of free legal services.  8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b).  The 
stowaway applicant may present witnesses and may submit 
affidavits of witnesses and other evidence.  8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b).  
The regulations do not require that the interview be recorded, 
and they require the applicant to provide his own interpreter.  8 
C.F.R. § 208.9(g).  If denied asylum, the stowaway applicant may 
appeal his denial to the BIA.  8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(4).  Thus, the 
INS and BIA construe the INA and the Refugee Act as entitling 
stowaways only to a nonadversarial interview conducted by an INS 
asylum officer with limited due process safeguards, while all 
other aliens are entitled to an adversarial asylum hearing before 
a neutral immigration judge with a full panoply of due process 
safeguards.  Petitioner contends, however, that Congress intended 
stowaways to be afforded the same asylum procedures as other 
aliens.   
 
C.       Congressional Intent 
              The district court deferred to the BIA's 
construction of the INA and the Refugee Act of 1980.  In Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-step approach to 
judicial review of agency interpretations of acts of Congress.  
First, the reviewing court must determine whether there is a 
clear and unambiguous congressional intent concerning the precise 
question in issue.  If congressional intent is clear and 
unambiguous, then that intent is the law and must be given 
effect.  A reviewing court proceeds to the second step "if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue."  Id. at 843.  Then, "the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute."  Id.   The Court noted: 
                       The judiciary is the final authority on 
                  issues of statutory construction and must 
                  reject administrative constructions which are 
                  contrary to clear congressional 
                  intent . . . .  If a court, employing 
                  traditional tools of statutory construction, 
                  ascertains that Congress had an intention on 
                  the precise question at issue, that intention 
                  is the law and must be given effect. 
         Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).  In this case, 
we do not reach the second step of Chevron because Congress 
expressed a clear and unambiguous intent with regard to the 
precise question at issue. 
              In construing the meaning of the Refugee Act of 
1980, the Supreme Court has examined the plain meaning of the 
Act, its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and its 
legislative history.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
449 (1987).  The analytical problem in this case is similar to 
that in Cardoza-Fonseca:  how should changes to the INA made by 
Congress through the Refugee Act of 1980 be construed?  At issue 
in Cardoza-Fonseca was whether eligibility for asylum should be 
based on the "persecution or well-founded fear of persecution" 
standard in the Refugee Act of 1980, or on the more stringent 
"life or freedom would be threatened" standard originally 
provided in the INA.  Under the Chevron framework, the Court used 
traditional tools of statutory construction and examined 
legislative history and the United Nations protocol in 
determining that Congress had expressed a clear intent on the 
eligibility standard in enacting the Refugee Act of 1980.  
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449.  
              In this case, the plain meaning of the Refugee Act 
is clear and unambiguous.  The Act provides, "The Attorney 
General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically 
present in the United States or at a land border or port of 
entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for 
asylum . . . ."  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (emphasis added).  The 
government argues that the Attorney General fulfilled this 
mandate by establishing one asylum procedure for stowaways and 
another asylum procedure for other aliens.  The plain language of 
the Refugee Act leaves no room for a construction permitting 
differing asylum procedures for aliens based on their status:  
Congress plainly stated that the "Attorney General shall 
establish a procedure."  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (emphasis added); see 
also Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(finding in the legislative history of the Refugee Act that 
Congress directed the Attorney General to establish "‘a new 
uniform asylum procedure'") (citing H. Conf. Rep. No. 781, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 
161).  Congress clearly intended a single, uniform procedure be 
established to satisfy our treaty obligation under the U.N. 
Protocol. 
              In mandating the establishment of a procedure for 
asylum applicants, Congress plainly stated in the Refugee Act 
that a uniform asylum hearing shall apply "irrespective of such 
alien's status."  Section 1182(a)(6)(D) classifies stowaways as 
"excludable aliens," and § 1323(d) exempts stowaways from 
exclusion hearings.  Section 1158(a), however, mandates that the 
asylum procedure established by the Attorney General be applied 
irrespective of an alien's status, which clearly would include 
aliens with stowaway status.  Thus, under the plain meaning of 
the Refugee Act, Congress clearly and unambiguously intended that 
the Attorney General establish a uniform asylum procedure that is 
to be applied irrespective of an alien's status as a stowaway. 
              Our construction of the Refugee Act is consistent 
with § 1323(d) because the Attorney General can establish a 
uniform asylum procedure separate from the exclusion hearing.  
The Refugee Act mandates a uniform asylum procedure for all 
asylum applicants; for stowaways, the resulting hearing can be 
limited solely to the issue of asylum eligibility.  This 
preserves the basic thrust of § 1323(d), which commands that 
stowaways are not entitled to an exclusion hearing.  Yiu Sing 
Chun, 708 F.2d at 876. 
 
D.       The Second Circuit's Pre-Chevron Construction of 
         Stowaways under the Refugee Act 
 
              Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, 
this very issue was addressed by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).  
In Yiu Sing Chun, the court examined Congress's intent in 
enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 and concluded that stowaways' 
"procedural rights as asylum applicants derive from the Refugee 
Act of 1980."  Id. at 874.  The court explained and held: 
                    Section 1323(d) is a specific provision 
                    detailing the treatment afforded alien 
                    stowaways.  This provision must be read in 
                    light of § 1182 which defines "general 
                    classes" of "[e]xcludable aliens."  Although 
                    § 1182(a)(18) lists "[a]liens who are 
                    stowaways" as an excludable class, § 1182(a) 
                    contains a proviso stating that its 
                    definitions are applicable "[e]xcept as 
                    otherwise provided in this chapter."  The 
                    Refugee Act limits the effect of § 1323(d) by 
                    "otherwise provid[ing]" that aliens applying 
                    for asylum may do so "irrespective of . . . 
                    status."  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).  Whatever 
                    procedural limitations § 1323(d) might impose 
                    in the absence of § 1158, we hold that these 
                    limitations are not applicable in the asylum 
                    context to the extent and only to the extent 
                    that an asylum determination is involved. 
                     
          Yiu Sing Chun, 708 F.2d at 874-75.  In ascertaining 
"congressional intent that the ‘Attorney General . . . establish 
a uniform procedure for passing upon an asylum application' under 
the Refugee Act," the Second Circuit employed traditional tools 
of statutory construction, examined internal INS procedures, 
legislative history and the United Nations Protocol, and 
considered the "dictates of procedural due process."  Id. at 872, 
874, 875, 876, 877 n.25.  Although not analyzed within the 
Chevron framework, Yui Sing Chun supports our conclusion that 
Congress clearly and unambiguously intended that the asylum 
procedures established by the Attorney General be applied 
irrespective of an alien's status as a stowaway. 
 
E.       BIA's Inconsistent Interpretations 
              The Second Circuit rejected the manner in which 
the INS applied its regulations to stowaways and held that 
stowaways were entitled to "whatever other procedural rights 
other asylum applicants are afforded."  Yui Sing Chun v. Sava, 
708 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1983).  The BIA declined to follow Yui 
Sing Chun outside the Second Circuit.  See Matter of Waldei, 19 I 
& N Dec. 189 (BIA 1984).  In Waldei, the BIA concluded that 
"[t]he alien stowaway is not deprived of the opportunity to have 
his asylum claim considered, but in view of his status under the 
[INA] that opportunity is limited."  Id. at 193.  Thus, in Waldeithe BIA 
reaffirmed its approval of the INS's nonadversarial 
interview procedure for stowaways, despite the fact that the 
procedure did not require the interview to be recorded. 
              The BIA has subsequently acknowledged on several 
occasions that the stowaway asylum procedure does not produce an 
adequate record for review and has vacated INS asylum decisions 
due to the inadequate record.  In this case the BIA stated, "This 
Board was not provided with a transcript of statements made by 
the applicant in his interviews with the asylum officer or with a 
meaningful summary of those statements, and, consequently, has no 
basis for evaluating any testimony presented at the interviews."  
Am. Stipulated J.A., No. 55 (In re Mircea Marincas, No. A70 867 
421, at 2 (BIA May 4, 1995)).  In a published case, the BIA has 
held that the record created by the stowaway asylum procedure 
"provides an inadequate basis for determining credibility and 
therefore fairly adjudicating the applicant's persecution claim."  
In re S-S-, Applicant, Interim Dec. (BIA) 3257 (BIA Nov. 8, 
1995).  The BIA in S-S-, Applicant had to remand the case to the 
INS so a suitable record could be produced.  Id.  In another 
case, the BIA stated in relevant part: 
                        We are unable to enter a decision in 
                    this case on the basis of the record before 
                    us.  In a notice of intent to deny dated 
                    January 27, 1993, the commissioner relied 
                    upon statements allegedly made by the 
                    applicant in his interview with the asylum 
                    officer.  However, no transcript or summary 
                    of the applicant's assertions is contained in 
                    the record.  Rather, the facts set forth in 
                    the notice of intent to deny constitute the 
                    only record of the applicant's interview with 
                    the asylum officer that is contained in the 
                    record file.  The applicant disputes the 
                    facts reflected in the notice. 
                     
                             In order to fully and fairly review a 
                    decision entered in a case, this Board must 
                    have before it the primary evidentiary 
                    matters relied upon by the initial 
                    adjudicator, in this case, either a 
                    transcript of the statements made by the 
                    applicant in support of his persecution claim 
                    or a meaningful, clear, and complete summary 
                    of those statements prepared by the 
                    interviewing asylum officer. . . .  The Board 
                    needs to know the questions asked an 
                    applicant, as well as his responses, before 
                    we can evaluate whether a notice of intent to 
                    deny accurately and thoroughly reflects what 
                    transpired in the proceedings before the 
                    asylum officer and whether the applicant's 
                    persecution claim was adequately developed in 
                    those proceedings.  This is especially true 
                    where, as here, the applicant contends that 
                    the notice of intent to deny does not 
                    accurately reflect his claims. 
                     
          Am. Stipulated J.A., No. 61 (In re Chila, No. A72 418 113, at 2 
(BIA May 6, 1993) (citations omitted)).  The fact that the BIA 
has held the asylum procedure provided stowaways is inadequate 
further supports our conclusion that the BIA is misconstruing the 
Refugee Act. 
              In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), 
the Court stated: 
                    An additional reason for rejecting the INS's 
                    request for heightened deference to its 
                    position is the inconsistency of the 
                    positions the BIA has taken through the 
                    years.  An agency interpretation of a 
                    relevant provision which conflicts with the 
                    agency's earlier interpretation is "entitled 
                    to considerably less deference" than a 
                    consistently held agency view. 
                     
          Id. at 446 n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 
(1981)).  We believe the BIA's decisions in Waldei, S-S-, 
Applicant, and Chila reflect an inherent inconsistency in the 
BIA's interpretation of the Refugee Act.  In Waldei the BIA held 
that stowaways were only entitled to a nonadversarial interview 
procedure conducted by an INS asylum officer, and it implicitly 
approved an INS procedure that does not require the interview to 
be recorded.  In cases after Waldei the BIA has held that the 
asylum procedure for stowaways is so deficient that it cannot be 
effectively reviewed.  We cannot defer to the BIA's construction 
of the Refugee Act, which approves of the INS's asylum procedure 
for stowaways while condemning that same procedure as creating an 
inadequate record for review. 
 
F.       Due Process Concerns under the Refugee Act 
              Finally, we believe the INS and BIA are 
misconstruing the Refugee Act because we doubt Congress intended 
the Attorney General to establish an asylum procedure for 
stowaways that fails to provide basic due process.  "[A]n alien 
seeking initial admission to the United States requests a 
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his 
application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a 
sovereign prerogative."  Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 
(1982).  Aliens only have those statutory rights granted by 
Congress.  When Congress directs an agency to establish a 
procedure, however, it can be assumed that Congress intends that 
procedure to be a fair one.  See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 
682, 693 (1979) (assuming "a congressional solicitude for fair 
procedure, absent explicit statutory language to the contrary"); 
see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976) (explaining 
that under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974), 
minimum due process rights attach to statuory rights).  In this 
case Congress instructed the Attorney General to establish an 
asylum procedure, and United States' treaty obligations and 
fairness mandate that the asylum procedure promulgated by the 
Attorney General provide the most basic of due process. 
              Precisely what minimum procedures are due under a 
statutory right depends on the circumstances of the particular 
situation.  See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983); 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 227 (1976).  The basic procedural 
rights Congress intended to provide asylum applicants under the 
Refugee Act are particularly important because an applicant 
erroneously denied asylum could be subject to death or 
persecution if forced to return to his or her home country.  We 
do not attempt to precisely detail here all of the basic 
procedures mandated under the Refugee Act for asylum applicants.  
The current asylum procedure for stowaways, however, fails to 
provide two of the most basic of due process protections--a 
neutral judge and a complete record of the proceeding.  These 
inadequacies of the asylum procedures afforded stowaways are 
particularly troubling because they insulate the INS's denial of 
asylum from effective administrative and judicial review.  
Although asylum applicants do not have constitutional due process 
protections, we believe that in accord with the U.N. Protocol, 
Congress intended the Attorney General to establish a uniform 
asylum procedure that is fair and that applies irrespective of 
alien status.  The existing INS asylum procedure for stowaways is 
inherently unfair, and,  therefore, the procedure is contrary to 
the clear intent of Congress. 
              Stowaway asylum applicants must be afforded the 
same asylum procedures deemed necessary for other aliens.  In 
addition to a hearing before a neutral immigration judge and a 
transcribed record of the proceeding, the INS regulations provide 
non-stowaway asylum applicants the following procedural rights:  
to be advised of their right to counsel and of the availability 
of free legal services; to a public hearing; to examine and 
object to adverse evidence; to compel testimony of witnesses by 
subpoena; and to administrative review.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.12, 
3.35, 3.38, 236.2, 236.3, 236.7.  Current INS regulations do not 
clearly delineate between the procedures provided aliens in 
exclusion hearings and asylum hearings.  The above procedures, 
however, are provided by INS regulations to non-stowaway aliens 
in their asylum hearing.  Under the Refugee Act, of course, the 
Attorney General may modify those procedures which go beyond the 
minimum due process rights required by fairness to which all 
asylum applicants are entitled. 
              Additionally, Petitioner asserts that the asylum 
procedures promulgated by the Attorney General are deficient 
because they fail to provide for a translator.  It is difficult 
to imagine how any bona fide refugee, with little or no knowledge 
of English, could ever spontaneously convey a "well-founded fear 
of persecution" to an asylum officer.  Courts have recognized the 
importance of a competent translator to ensure the fairness of 
proceedings to applicants who do not speak English.  See, e.g., 
Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) ("A hearing is 
of no value when the alien and the judge are not 
understood . . . .  The very essence of due process is a 
‘meaningful opportunity to be heard.'"); see also Tejeda-Mata v. 
INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
994 (1982); Niarchos v. INS, 393 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1968).  
Moreover, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979), appropriately characterizes access 
to "the services of a competent interpreter" as a fundamental 
requirement.  The United Nations Handbook "provides significant 
guidance in construing the [1967] Protocol, to which Congress 
sought to conform."  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 
n.22 (1987).  Thus, in addition to requiring the INS to apply 
to stowaways those procedures which are provided all asylum 
applicants, we also hold that at a minimum those procedures must 
also include the services of a translator.  Otherwise, an asylum 
applicant's procedural rights would be meaningless in cases where 
the judge and asylum applicant cannot understand each other 
during the hearing. 
              We conclude that the Refugee Act of 1980 clearly 
and unambiguously requires that the Attorney General promulgate 
and apply to stowaways seeking asylum the same fair procedure as 
other asylum applicants and that those procedures must include 
the services of a translator. 
 
IV.      Whether Reasonable Evidence Supported the Asylum  
         Application 
 
              Petitioner contends the district court erred in 
finding that reasonable evidence supported the INS's denial of 
Mr. Marincas' asylum application.  We cannot address this issue 
because the record is inadequate.  The district court's findings 
on this issue are necessarily vacated by our conclusion that 
Petitioner's asylum hearing was procedurally deficient.  On 
remand Mr. Marincas should receive an asylum hearing which will 
produce a reviewable record.  
              The judgment of the district court will be 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accord with this 
opinion. 
 
                                                  
No. 95-5424 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
         I join in Judge McKay's fine opinion on the 
understanding that it is ultimately founded not on the due 
process clause but on congressional intent (i.e., the intent that 
asylum claimants receive a uniform, fair process).  However, I do 
not join in Judge McKay's discussion of the necessity of specific 
procedures, such as the need for an independent adjudicator or 
for a translator.  I would prefer to let the INS decide in the 
first instance what procedures best conform to this court's 
mandate. 
